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Abstract
How do different concepts of justice correspond with the principles of diversity in cities introduced by Jane Jacobs? This
contribution connects Jane Jacobs’ ideas on the diverse city with Mary Douglas’ Cultural Theory and its concept of clumsy
solutions. According to Douglas’ Cultural Theory, every social situation can be described in terms of the four ideal-typical
“rationalities”: individualism, egalitarianism, hierarchism, and fatalism. These four rationalities are again linked to different
concepts of justice: libertarian, utilitarian, or social justice. Douglas’ Cultural Theory assumes that in every social situation
all four of those rationalities emerge in some way and concludes that if a situation is not polyrational, it is less robust. This
opts for imperfect and “clumsy solutions”. It is argued that clumsy solutions, the four rationalities and related concepts fit
Jane Jacobs’ claim for more diversity in urban design. This essentially calls for imperfect cities by design, ‘built’ by Jacobs’
generators for diversity. Although this outcomemight not be revolutionary in the current debates about urban design, the
concept of clumsy solutions provide a foundation for Jane Jacobs’ atheoretical claim for a diverse city. This contributes to
new reflections on the urban planning paradigms of Jane Jacobs.
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1. Introduction. Urban Design Principles for Diversity
in Cities
Jane Jacobs regarded diversity as a natural feature of big
cities (Jacobs, 1961). Cities, however, do not generate di-
versity “automatically […] just by existing, [but] they gen-
erate it because of the various efficient economic pools
of use that they form” (Jacobs, 1961, p. 148). Since then,
the ideas of Jacobs have been reflected numerous times
in urban design and planning. The debate on diversity in
cities has not diminished and is still relevant for contem-
porary urban planning. Declarations such as “cities are
by definition places of intense diversity and heterogene-
ity” (Dahinden, 2013, p. 39) or “diversity represents the
newguiding principle for city planners” (Fainstein, 2005b,
p. 3) reflect the tone in the discussion about this condi-
tion in cities. Fainstein sees diversity—among others—
as a key criteria for the just city, encompassing diversity
of the physical environment as well as social relations
(Fainstein, 2010). Diversity matters in urban planning.
Jacobs formulated the idea that “the ruthless, over-
simplified, pseudo-city planning and pseudo-city design
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we get today is a form of ‘un-building’ cities” (1961,
p. 408). This is a phenomenon which we were able to
observe in past years during the modern urban planning
era, which was fuel for conflict for Jacobs’ fight against
Robert Moses and still can observe today, while recog-
nizing that there is a trend again towards large-scale
redevelopment projects (Schubert, 2014, p. 9). Jacobs
recommended to generate diversity by urban planning.
She prefers “fine-grain, block-by-block diversity” (Larson,
2009, p. 36). Therefore, she suggests four design princi-
ples in hermost famous book TheDeath and Life of Great
American Cities (Jacobs, 1961, p. 150):
• Mixed use of an area which attracts the presence
of people on the streets and places;
• Short blocks with frequent street crossings and op-
portunities to turn corners;
• Fairly close-grained mingle of buildings (age and
condition);
• Dense concentration of people, including dense
concentration of residents.
Jacobs’ design principles pursue diversity. This advice for
urban design shall serve urban planners as a basis to de-
sign more diverse cities.
Jacobs complained that city planning in the 1960’s
ignored urban theory and instead misused the cities as
“an immense laboratory of trial and error” (Jacobs, 1961,
p. 6). But Jacobs’ design principles also lack theoreti-
cal foundation. So, can we justify Jane Jacobs’ design
principles with theory? Contemporary authors raise the
concern that planning theory in general does not suffi-
ciently address substantive aspects of planning, namely
urban design (Fainstein, 2005a; Jabareen, 2006; Stern-
berg, 2000; Talen & Ellis, 2002). Urban design is often
assigned to values such as beauty; planning theorists
are diffident and cautious towards such normative is-
sues (Talen & Ellis, 2002). Instead, urban design relies
on “architectural ideas whose theoretical justifications
are unclear” (Sternberg, 2000, p. 265). Urban design is
understood here as the self-conscious creation of cities
(Lang, 2009) by a public planning authority. Urban de-
signers have generated urban design based on “eclectic
reading, common sense, on-the-job experience, and per-
sonal predilection” (Talen & Ellis, 2002, p. 44). Theoret-
ical discussions in planning predominantly address pro-
cedural aspects of planning (Sternberg, 2000; Talen & El-
lis, 2002) and the justification of the planning activity it-
self (Hartmann&Needham, 2012). Recently, Beauregard
reaffirmed the need for a planning theory that is more
concerned with the planning substance itself.
There is not only a lack, but also a need, for more the-
oretical considerations of the ideas of Jane Jacobs, specif-
ically for her claim for diversity in cities. Planners make
choices over issues which are often highly contested
(Campbell, 2006). Because these choices are contested—
Needhampoints out that planning “makes people poorer
or richer” (Needham, 2006, p. 3)—it is an activity that
is profoundly concerned with justice (Campbell, 2006).
The decisions made by urban planners and urban design-
ers, about place-making shape our living environment.
“[T]he ethical dimension in question cannot be separated
from the ‘physical’ dimension of the city (i.e. urban de-
sign, technology, architecture, and related fields)” (Kid-
der, 2008, p. 254). Planners raise the question, why they
plan and what is planning for. The inherent normative
dimension and complexity of planning (Hartmann, 2012)
and planning interventions have been tried to justify for
instance in the building environment by economic theory
(Moore, 1978).
How to deal with normativity? There are in social
and political science two conceptual camps of dealing
with the normativity: one camp builds on the assump-
tion that societies function on same or similar normative
premises; the other camp acknowledges pluralism and
assumes that the complexity of society impedes the de-
velopment of policy solutions (Benford & Snow, 2000).
The rational choice theory or the homo oeconomicus are
typical contenders of the first camp. They approach pol-
icy issues with the idea to find one perfect fitting solu-
tion (Hartmann & Hengstermann, 2014). Mary Douglas’
Cultural Theory also belongs to theories acknowledging
pluralism in social situations, rejecting approaches from
the first camp. It provides a simple analytical scheme that
allows reducing the pluralism to a manageable number
of four without rejecting pluralism. This theory cannot
resolve normativity, but it can help to reflect on it in a
structured way. This paper is an attempt to provide this
theoretical reflection relating different concepts of jus-
tice with Mary Douglas’ Cultural Theory and its clumsy
solutions, which have been introduced byMarco Verweij,
Michael Thompson and their colleagues (Verweij, 2011).
The remaining paper is subdivided in three main sec-
tions. First, an overview of three fundamental and com-
peting concepts of justice is provided, and they are used
to examine today’s issues and outcomes in spatial plan-
ning. Second, a theory is introduced dealing with the di-
versity of different rationalities and justice approaches,
which is Cultural Theory, as developed by Mary Douglas,
Michael Thompson, and fellows. This theory is used to
derive the concept of the clumsy city as an approach to
deal with pluralism, thus creating diversity in the city. In
the third section, this concept is compared with Jane Ja-
cobs’ ideas on design principles for a diverse city. The
combination of Jane Jacobs, Cultural Theory and the con-
cepts of justice thus provide not only a theoretical foun-
dation, and to some extent a justification of Jane Jacobs’
ideas, but also a solution—a clumsy one—for dealing
with diversity in urban design and planning.
2. Different Concepts of Justice and the City
A range of different opinions explore what is just and
what is not (Davy, 1997). Different schools of thought
have produced different concepts of justice (Sandel,
2007). Concepts of justice—most of the time implicitly—
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are grounded in people’s daily lives, their moral under-
standing, and general ethics. But they are also embed-
ded in law and politics. People’s notion of justice helps
them to justify and legitimize activities, because a con-
cept of justice defines what the right thing to do is
(Sandel, 2010).
Why should urban planners be concerned with dif-
ferent concepts of justice? A concept of justice has al-
ways been part of the urban planning construct and
eventually different concepts of justice contradict each
other (Thaler & Hartmann, 2016). Acting according to
one concept inherently implies neglecting and even act-
ing against other concepts of justice (Davy, 1997). In-
evitably the result is injustice in urban planning. Urban
planners need to be equipped with the knowledge and
ability to reflect on different concepts of justice. Our fo-
cus will be, according to Douglas’ Cultural Theory we
introduce later in this paper, on the concepts of jus-
tice known as Utilitarianism (Bentham, 1907/2007; Mill,
1863/2007), Libertarianism (Hayek, 1944/1991) and So-
cial Justice (Rawls, 1971/2005). These concepts of justice
in their main ideas are still being used and seen as com-
mon perspectives among concepts of justice. Therefore,
in the following sections, we will briefly sketch the basic
rationales of each of these three concepts and outline
their principles and influences for urban design.
2.1. Utilitarian Justice—The City for the Greatest
Happiness of the Greatest Number
Utilitarian justice in its fundamentals pursues the key
axiom ‘maximize happiness’ (Bentham, 1907/2007). It
is developed by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.
Bentham is deemed to be the founder of Utilitarianism
and became famous through his book An Introduction
of Moral and Legislation, where Mill represents a more
moderate notion of Utilitarian justice (Mill, 1863/2007).
The utilitarian concept of utility involves two main out-
comes: (1) pleasure (positive reaction) and (2) pain (neg-
ative reaction). The resulting distribution of ‘pleasure’
and ‘pain’ benefits the majority (at the costs of minori-
ties). We can conclude that Utilitarianism starts from the
premise that every decision should be based on weigh-
ing happiness and pain, and likewise costs and benefits.
The end purpose is to raise happiness and to minimize
pain (Sandel, 2010).
How can we translate this moral principle into public
decisions? Here, we are not just evaluating our own hap-
piness and pain, but instead assessing an approach that
strives for “the greatest happiness of the greatest num-
ber that is the measure of right and wrong” (Bentham,
1907/2007). This slogan implies that it’s not just the in-
tensity of happiness that counts, but also the size of the
group who is benefitting (Sandel, 2007).
So, what does it mean for urban design? In plan-
ning processes, the “greatest happiness principle” or the
“principle of utility” is achieved in utilitarian justice when
we gainmore utility than pain for society. In this way, Util-
itarianism acts as a spokesman for powerful urban plan-
ning. According to this concept of justice, the state has
the task to protect the happiness of the majority (Davy,
2012). So utilitarian urban planners need to ask whether
a certain planning measure will, in sum, increase more
pleasure than inducing pain. This implies that such plan-
ning accepts sacrifices (e.g. expropriation of landowners,
imposing nuisances to some) if with this measure the
benefits of more land users will be increased. This pro-
vides a clear guideline for urban planners, if they man-
age to assess costs and benefits of certain plan alterna-
tives. Urban planners are equipped with multiple meth-
ods, such as cost-benefit analysis, GIS models, and so
forth. The result of a utilitarian urban design would most
likely be a very functional and almost sober city with
rather straight lines, clear rules and separated functions.
The city of Le Corbusier, or urban design according to
Bauhaus principles, might resemble ideas of a utilitarian
city (Steinø, 2013), as well as the social welfare function
(Alexander, 2002).
We agree with Steinø that “cities should be more
than just functional entities, providing merely for utilitar-
ian needs” (Steinø, 2013, p. 73). Furthermore, there are
two main objections against utilitarianism: first, it’s hard
to fully evaluate all benefits and costs (pain and pleasure,
respectively) in a fair way, and it is also difficult to achieve
consensual evaluation methods. Second, one mode of
thought suggests individual rights are a value in itself. In
this case, the question rises of what the other concepts
of justice are.
2.2. Libertarian Justice—The City of Freedom and
Opportunities
Libertarian justice emphasizes the liberty of individuals
(Sandel, 2010). The state should be as minimal as possi-
ble, reducing its interventions to the reduction of market
failures (Hess & Ostrom, 2007; North, 1990). Libertarian
justice supports the idea of an invisible hand in the mar-
ket, which ultimately leads to fair outcomes. Libertarian
principles are hostile to utilitarian principles, because the
latter focuses on the maximization of happiness for the
greatest number, which brings losses, but consents to
them tomaximise the happiness of each individual. Free-
dom of individual self-determination is central in libertar-
ian justice (Hayek, 1944/1991; Johnson, Tunstall, Priest,
McCarthy, & Penning-Rowsell, 2008). This can be sum-
marized in the principle that libertarianism supports indi-
vidual rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
This doctrine can also be found in the “TheDeclaration of
Independence” in the United States. Important thinkers
of libertarian justice are Milton Friedman, Robert Nozick
and Friedrich A. Hayek. John Locke is also a central fig-
ure because he applied libertarianism to the concept of
property rights (Hartmann, in press).
The libertarian city would designate itself as a city
of freedom and opportunities. This translates into an ur-
ban design with minimal rules. Most likely this city will
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develop with large plots of individually owned land and
minimal public spaces. In the Netherlands, there is an
experiment that resembles this concept of justice: the
case of AlmereOosterweld. This is an area of about 4,300
hectare, which will accommodate circa 15,000 new resi-
dential houses. Within this ongoing project, building reg-
ulations have been minimized to allow each landowner
to develop his or her own idea of home. It is promoted as
an area that embraces creativity and opportunity. Sum-
marized, in a perfect libertarian world, a libertarian city
facilitates liberty and self-ownership for each individual
in the society.
Critiques on libertarian justice address the inherent
increase of inequalities. Privatization and gentrification
processes, for instance, are two negative examples of
possible symptoms caused by a libertarian planning pol-
icy. Critics suggest that the initial resource allocation sup-
ports the haves against the have-nots. Therefore, the ini-
tial unequal assignment of property rights to different
persons undermines the very principle of the right to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
2.3. Social Fair Justice—The City of Fairness and Equality
The Theory of Justice in 1971 from John Rawls is one
of the key publications on social justice (Sandel, 2010).
Rawls’ thoughts became very influential in debates on
concepts of justice, but also gained attention in the plan-
ning literature in recent years (Basta 2015; Basta & Mo-
roni, 2013; Campbell & Marshall, 2002; Fainstein, 2010).
As a critique of utilitarian principles, Rawls offered a new
point of view on social justice that shares some ideas
with Utilitarianism and cannot be seen as entirely de-
tached from that theory (Campbell, 2006). Rawls’s main
point of criticismwas thatUtilitarianism is just looking for
an overall sum of happiness, but not how is it distributed
in the society (Basta & Moroni, 2013).
According to Rawls, we need a social contract with
defined rules based on ethical aspects, which foster our
daily life as we coexist. Rawls puts one’s position, that
is potentially involved in the construction of the social
contract, behind a so-called “veil of ignorance” (Rawls,
1971/2005). This puts one in a position where all the
members of a society slip into the same role: ultimately
describing his first principle. This means we don’t know
anyone’s rank or status in society. Executed further, this
means we don’t know if these members are poor or rich,
or if we are dealing with talented or untalented people.
Since our own position is unknown as well, ideally, when
we raise the veil of ignorance, all rights, chances and
opportunities are distributed equally among the society
(Rawls, 1971/2005).
The socially just city is designed in a way that all
groups of the society are included. There is space for
bankers and beggars, children and elderly, citizens and
refugees. From Rawls’s standpoint it would not be fair
for all groups to have their space, but instead emphasizes
improving the life prospects of the least advantaged, as
we’re living in a world full of inequalities. In a socially
just city under Rawls, this leads to spacious communal
areas, affordable housing, and open and attractive pub-
lic spaces.
There exist variations and related concepts to social
justice, which shall not be in the focus in this paper. For
further reading we recommend Sandel (2010) and Har-
vey (1996). Critiques on social justice focus on its actual
realization. Although many people see an inherent and
intuitive moral supremacy of social justice compared to
the other concepts, it is a very costly concept of justice. In
addition, libertarians criticize that in a purely socially just
world, incentives for innovation and performance are
lacking. As in utilitarianism, the socially just city needs
strong and powerful urban planning to enforce the redis-
tribution and allocation of resources.
3. Mary Douglas’ Cultural Theory and Clumsy Solution
The previous section leaves us with a dilemma: there are
three different but opposing concepts of justice. None
is ultimately superior to the other as each concept has
its justification and its inherent logic, but also has its pit-
falls. They contradict each other. This section compares
the three concepts of justice with Cultural Theory.
Cultural Theory is a social-constructivist theory. Al-
though Cultural Theory originates from anthropology
and has been much used in research on risk-perception
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983; Renn, 2008), it has also
been applied and discussed in planning theory (Davy,
1997, 2004; Hartmann, 2011; Hartmann & Hengster-
mann, 2014; Hendriks, 1999). In contrast to many other
approaches in cultural anthropology, Mary Douglas de-
veloped a theory that enables analyzing social interac-
tions without complicated ethnographic analysis. Her
claim was to develop a framework “that is able to deal
with culture everywhere”. Thus, her field work was not
confined to Melanesia or Africa, but includes western
societies (Mamadouh, 1999). Cultural Theory does not
restrict itself to analyzing cultures with all its variations
in definition, but instead refers to social solidarities
(Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990).
Basically, Cultural Theory is built on the assumption
that every social situation can be described in terms
of four ideal-typical (Hendriks, 1999) “cultures” (Ellis &
Thompson, 1997) or “rationalities” (Davy, 2008; Hart-
mann, 2012): individualism, egalitarianism, hierarchism,
and fatalism. These rationalities can be acted out by in-
dividuals, groups of individuals, or institutions (Douglas,
1986). They describe different rational ways to perceive
and act in certain situations. It is an important notion
to assign rationalities to situations, not to persons. A
situation-oriented approach asks how, not by whom, ra-
tionalities are involved in certain situations (Davy, 2004).
The situation-oriented approach to Cultural Theory as-
sumes that a persons’ actions do not determine situa-
tions but rather situations determine a persons’ actions.
This is an important premise to translate this theory to
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urban design. The same person can act out one rational-
ity in one particular situation, and another rationality in
another situation.
The rationalities are assumed to be internally con-
sistent, mutually contradictory, and jointly exhaustive
(Schwarz& Thompson, 1990). Thismeans that each ratio-
nality is rational on its own, but irrational from the per-
spective of the other rationalities (Thompson, 2008). The
four rationalities aremapped out in the two-dimensional
“grid and group” scheme (see Figure 1). “Grid” indicates
the extent of decision-making autonomy to which a de-
cision maker is bound to externally imposed structures,
rules, and prescriptions. A high grid stands, accordingly,
for heteronymous decision-making; a weak grid refers to
a high degree of self-determination. “Group” indicates
whether an individual is likely to join a group or prefers
to act as an individual. The higher the group dimension,
the more community-bounded an individual acts (Ellis
& Thompson, 1997). Since the two dimensions are inde-
pendent, they form a diagram with two axes and four
quadrants. The four rationalities can be located in each
quadrant, so that each rationality can be described by
a combination of the two dimensions, grid and group.
The differences between the rationalities are illustrated
with a pictogram, showing a ball in a landscape. The ball
represents the world; the landscape represents the be-
havioral characteristics of the world towards interven-
tions (Ellis & Thompson, 1997) (see Figure 1). These pic-
tograms explain how the rationality believes that the
world reacts on disturbances and helps build understand-
ing about appropriate problem-solving mechanisms for
the four rationalities. They are characterized in the fol-
lowing paragraphs.
Individualism: The individualistic pictogram shows a
ball on the bottom of a valley (see Figure 1). It cannot
crash down; rather it is in a relatively stable equilibrium.
In this world, trial and error allow exploration of newpos-
sibilities. Individualism is the most libertarian rational-
ity. It rejects regulations and does not believe in collab-
orative governance styles. Instead, individualism prefers
market approaches. Urban design serves to achieve effi-
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Figure 1. The rationalities of Cultural Theory (“grid and
group” scheme).
cient allocations of goods (Sorensen & Day, 1981). For
individualism, private property is regarded as a driving
force for economic growth and welfare (Ostrom, 2000).
Public goods are considered a source for market failure
(Cooter & Ulen, 2004). Individualism fits the concept of
libertarian justice.
Egalitarianism: The egalitarian rationality is illus-
trated by a ball on the top of a hill. It is an unstable
equilibrium. This rationality neglects governmental in-
terventions and market schemes, and instead places a
strong emphasis on community. As the organizing prin-
ciple of individualism is the market, moral commitment
to the community is the egalitarian principle of organi-
zation (Thompson, 2008). Participative and collaborative
approaches such as “communicative planning” are wel-
come (Huxley, 2000). Planning should be carried out less
by law and regulations andmore by consensus and coop-
eration. Accordingly, urban design should create social
spaces to allow communities to assemble and collabo-
rate. This is a radically different leitmotif than the indi-
vidualistic idea of maximizing private property. Egalitari-
anism has a strong link with the concept of social justice.
Hierarchism: This rationality is depicted by a ball em-
bedded in a small dip on top of the hill. The preferred
mode of governance is by rules and regulations. Theoret-
ically, as in Thomas Hobbes’s “Leviathan,” members of
society give power to an institution that governs the wel-
fare of all people. The integrity of the institution is essen-
tial to keep the ball on top of the hill. Such institutions do
not necessarily need to be governmental (Douglas, 1999).
It is often put forward that hierarchism is able to prevent
a tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968). This rationality
prefers to regulate common goods, instead of using mar-
ket approaches or community schemes to allocate and
distribute goods. The rationality of hierarchism is linked
with utilitarian justice.
Fatalism:Whereas the three previously presented ra-
tionalities are often categorized as active rationalities, fa-
talism is the passive rationality. It stands for a laissez-
faire governance approach. This rationality neglects plan-
ning because of the complexity and wickedness of the
world. According to fatalism, it is simply not possible to
predict the chaotic jumble of the world. This is a very
planning-hostile rationality, because every intervention
depends on luck and fate. The ball lies in a flat landscape:
this pictogram reflects the unpredictability of the equilib-
rium. Fatalismdoes not prefer any of the three presented
concepts of justice, but does not believe in justice at all:
just luck and fate.
Each of the four rationalities prefers its own concept
of justice (or none, in the case of fatalism) (Schwarz &
Thompson, 1990). Still, Cultural Theory does not deter-
mine which concepts of justice are the best or most suit-
able. Cultural Theorists regard the four rationalities as
a system of plausible, rather than empirically demon-
strably true, rationalities (Dake, 1992; Hartmann, 2012;
Renn, 2008). For urban design, the dilemma of compet-
ing concepts of justice remains, in addition we are in a
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dilemma of four rationalities, each of those thinking to
be the only plausible rationality.
One of the central assumptions of Cultural Theory is
that in every social situation, all of these four rationalities
occasionally emerge in some way, which is known as the
‘impossibility theorem’ (Ellis & Thompson, 1997). This
impossibility theorem implies that if a situation is per-
fectly monorational (e.g. a well-ordered utilitarian and
designed city), the respective other rationalities reject
this situation. Vice versa, polyrational situations in which
all four rationalities and their related concepts of jus-
tice are embraced, aremore robust than a single-rational
situation (Davy, 2004). This leads to the idea of design-
ing cities in a way that all rationalities are embedded, in
the building process as well as in the ideas of the out-
come. From the point of view of each rationality, such a
city can never be perfect so the urban design is always
a compromise, and it appears clumsy. From this argu-
ment, the concept of clumsy solutions originates, which
has been developed by Marco Verweij, Michael Thomp-
son and their colleagues (Verweij, 2011).
A clumsy solution is seemingly the opposite of classi-
cal city planning back in the 1950’s and 1960’s when Jane
Jacobs was in the heyday of her political activities and
critique against orthodox city planning (Jacobs, 1961). A
clumsy solution isn’t looking for the well-designed city
(e.g. the grid system, as used in the United States to pro-
vide a car-friendly environment). Rather, a clumsy solu-
tion would be an approach to provide a car-friendly set-
ting, but also opt for a city that embraces all four ratio-
nalities and their related concepts of justice.
4. Diversity in Cities as Clumsy Solutions
So far, we discussed how different concepts of justice,
as with the different rationalities introduced by Dou-
glas’ Cultural Theory, are reflected in cityscapes and how
they correspond with the principles for diversity in cities
introduced by Jane Jacobs. In one last step, we com-
bine the concepts of justice with urban design by re-
ferring to Douglas’ Cultural Theory’s clumsy solutions.
Clumsy solutions, as outlined above, support the idea
of an imperfect—even clumsy—urban design. Clumsy
means the embodiment of different notions of justice
in a clumsy solution. This means embracing libertarian
principles (providing individual liberty), utilitarian justice
(greatest happiness for the greatest number), and social
justice (equality of outcome) at the same time. Fatalism
then opts to not design the city completely, but to leave
some aspects of urban design open.
How can we picture such an urban design? The re-
sulting city might come pretty close to the ideal city pur-
sued by Jane Jacobs. She frames design principles in her
famous book TheDeath and Life of Great American Cities,
whose functions are to create a basis to tap a city’s full
potential: mixed uses, aged buildings, small blocks and
an adjusted population density (Jacobs, 1961, pp. 150f.).
Furthermore, Jacobs specifically formulates the need for
economic diversity in a city, a consequence from her de-
sign principles and that is far more than just touching
the physical design of a city. She supports the idea of
a mixed use of economies, which means neighborhoods
cannot flourish if merely offering a single use economy.
A neighborhood needs big firms and retailers, but also
needs small and local economies since the smaller ones
are as important as the big ones to vitalize a neighbor-
hood. Hospers, vice versa, agrees that “diversity is of ma-
jor importance not only from a social perspective, but
also from an economic viewpoint” (2014, p. 127). This
gets underlined by Moroni as well, who argues for diver-
sity, to let “economic urban vitality” emerge (2016, p. 4).
In a next step Jacobs states that her physical design prin-
ciples combined with her recommended economic con-
dition unleash commercial diversity. When Jane Jacobs
explains that the: “Commercial diversity is, in itself, im-
mensely important for cities, socially as well as econom-
ically” (Jacobs, 1961, p. 148) she describes the process
that richness in a cities’ commerce, produces diversity
in various other forms as for instance social diversity, a
cities’ population and its users. Put together, Jacobs’ vi-
sion of awell working and functioning city includes neigh-
borhoods where there is space for everybody. This can
be translated into the terminology of Cultural Theory:
Space for different rationalities in a clumsy city.
This builds a bridge between Jane Jacobs’ thoughts
and different rationalities of Douglas’ Cultural Theory
with their inherent concepts of justice. Jacobs’ claim for
diversity is not based on a theory but stems from an intu-
itive normative claim for howa city shouldwork. Douglas’
Cultural Theory argues for diversity and provides such
theoretical underpinning. But how does the diversity in
urban design as put forward by Jacobs fit the diversity of
different rationalities by Cultural Theory?
To understand the relation between Jacobs’ and Dou-
glas’ ideas, the cities that are a result of a city built to Jane
Jacobs’ generators for diversity needs to be compared to
the clumsy city that Douglas would promote. Based on
the statement that “urban design can change the spatial
organization of the city, and consequently how it works”
(Madanipour, 2006, p. 185) it can also change the emerg-
ing social situations. The emergence of different ratio-
nalities creates a more diverse population and therefore
more diverse urban spaces. Assumed that Jacobs’ gen-
erators for diversity are adopted, the city creates diver-
sity in uses through insisting on a mix of primary uses.
Through this, the city creates a higher diversity in social
interactions during the whole day, and logically as a con-
sequence different emerging rationalities. Ensured short
blocks again raise the possibility of more social interac-
tions and social situations. Further on, varied aged build-
ings make room for different social classes as well as new
economies and this engenders again the presence of dif-
ferent rationalities. Through her last condition in having
a minimum density she also tries to make sure of more
social interactions that create social situations. Seifert re-
flects this: “returning to Jacobs: in the first instance, de-
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sign, structure, and form do not here mean what is ma-
terial, built, but something socio-cultural, that endows
built objects, in their various realizations, with meaning”
(Seifert, 2014, p. 57). So, a city ‘built’ by Jane Jacobs’ de-
sign principles is more polyrational. We can picture this
situation, when imagining the contrary, for example a dis-
trict with no mixed uses, large blocks, large and modern
concrete buildings including large streets with few cross-
ings. This would mean rather more monorational social
interactions, thus social situations and ultimately unsta-
ble conditions since they are not clumsy. When Hirt dis-
cusses zoning in the American and European planning
system, she declares that we make decisions about “so-
cial and spatial ordering” (Perin in Hirt, 2012, p. 389) and
that these decisions “both reflect and construct social
norms” (Hirt, 2012, p. 378).
5. Conclusion
Finally, Jacobs and Cultural Theory both reject cities en-
tirely designed according to elegance and a rational-
comprehensive planning, but promote cities that em-
brace imperfection and clumsiness. Jacobs prefers clum-
siness over elegance because of her claim that “genuine,
rich diversity of the built environment is always the prod-
uct of many, many different minds, and at its richest is
also the product of different periods of time with their
different aims and fashions” (Jacobs, 1981). Cultural The-
ory and its clumsy solutions agrees with this but justifies
clumsiness via its robustness against perfect solutions.
Clumsy solutions embrace all four rationalities and their
inherent concepts of justice. Jacobs promotes diversity
out of a normative claim, in the clumsy city diversity is
a result of different and competing rationalities. In that
way, Douglas’ Cultural Theory helps to justify Jacobs’ ur-
ban design principles.
What canwe ultimately learn from the particular per-
spective of Cultural Theory and assigned concepts of jus-
tice about the relevance of Jane Jacobs’ urban design
principles for today’s cities? Jane Jacobs’ ideas on how
cities should look like have been criticized as being nor-
mative, and she has been blamed as being an urban ac-
tivist (Fainstein, 2005a; Sternberg, 2000). To someextent,
this cannot be rejected from the arguments above. How-
ever, in terms of Cultural Theory, Jane Jacobs‘ ideas can
be an indication of the impossibility theorem. Jacobs op-
posed monorational city planning, such as the utilitar-
ian ideas of Robert Moses in rebuilding New York. From
the point of view of Cultural Theory, it is not a surprise
that she pushed forward ideas of social justice and even
libertarian elements in her concepts of the city. The de-
sign principles of Jacobs also resemble utilitarian aspects,
such as the clear grid she prefers for blocks. The poly-
rationality in Jacobs’ approach lies alsowithin her diverse
approach to design a city, because when we look at Ja-
cobs’ design principles, they’re not solely about physical
design. Her words of advice go far beyond the form of
buildings. Also Klemek agrees when he says “robust func-
tional diversity was fundamentally more important to
her than superficial stylistic distinctions” (Klemek, 2011,
p. 120). One of the reasons why the urban design based
on Jacobs’ design principles seems so appealing is be-
cause it is clumsy as well as the resulting diversity. In Ja-
cobs’ vision of a diverse city, there is space for everybody.
Space for various situations, space for differing rationali-
ties, space for different concepts of justice, space for di-
versity. In a nutshell: space for clumsy solutions.
There could be better ways to embrace four differ-
ent rationalities and their related concepts of justice,
but this contribution provides a theoretical framework
and justification to pursue clumsy cities by design. Ul-
timately, the theoretical underpinning of Jacobs urban
design principles does not only provide a justification of
her ideas from the 1960’s, but because the argument of
Cultural Theory prevails still today, it argues for the con-
tinuing relevance of the design principles for diversity
in cities. This asks for further empirical research testing
and proving this argument. Ultimately, the discussion on
connecting the visions of Jane Jacobs with Cultural The-
ory can contribute to revitalize the—often normative—
debates on the just city and question existing paradigms
in urban planning.
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